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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(k) and pursuant to the order of
the Utah Supreme Court dated September 16, 1993 transferring this
matter from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals for
disposition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether or not the lower court properly ruled that the

permissive use by defendants1 predecessor of a hand built
irrigation ditch across plaintiff's property did not ripen into
an adverse prescriptive easement in favor of defendants.
2.

Whether or not the verbal permission given to

defendants1 predecessor by the owner of the servient estate to
construct and use an irrigation ditch across the servient estate
is contractually deficient and in violation of the statute of
frauds.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues appealed by defendants were submitted to the
court on cross motions for summary judgment.

With minor

exceptions, the facts were undisputed below.

On appeal the court

reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness
without any particular deference given to the trial court.
Richards v. Security Pacific National Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah
App. 1993).

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Annotated (1943) §33-5-1
No estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust
or power over or concerning real property or in any
matter relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act
or operation of law or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized by writing.
Utah Code Annotated (1943) §101-4-2
The property, both real and personal, of one who dies
without disposing of it by will, passes to the heirs of
the intestate, subject to the control of the court, and
to the possession of any administrator appointed by the
court for the purposes of administration.
Utah Code Annotated (1943) §102-11-5
Actions for the recovery of any property, real or
personal, or for the possession thereof, or to quiet
title thereto, or to determine any adverse claim
thereon, and all actions founded upon contracts, may be
maintained by and against executors and administrators
in all cases in which the same might have been
maintained by or against their respective testators or
intestates.
Utah Code Annotated (1953) §57-1-6, Repealed by Laws 1988
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument
of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any
real estate or whereby any real estate may be affected,
to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved
or acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed
by this title and recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which such real estate is
situated, but shall be valid and binding between the
parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment,
certification or record, and as to all other persons
who have had actual notice. Neither the fact that an
instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites only a
nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in
such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the
2

conveyance otherwise purports to be in trust without
naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the
trust, shall operate to charge any third person with
notice of the interest of any person or persons not
named in such instrument or of the grantor or grantors;
but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser
interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free
and clear of all claims not disclosed by the instrument
or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the
interest claimed and describing the property charged
with such interest.
Utah Code Annotated (1953) §57-3-2(3)
This section does not affect the validity of a document
with respect to the parties to the document and all
other persons who have notice of the document.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff (as used herein, plaintiff refers to Duane Green)
brought this action to enjoin defendants from entering upon
plaintiff's land to affect the flow of water onto or across
plaintiff's land and for damages caused by the battery of
plaintiff by defendants.

(Record at 10-14).

Defendants

counterclaimed to establish by declaratory judgment a right in
water superior to plaintiff and declaring a permanent easement
across plaintiff's land for the purpose of conveying water, and
for damages for plaintiff's purported interference with the water
flowing across plaintiff's land.

(Record at 17-19).

PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of
defendant's claim to an easement and for an order enjoining
defendants from interfering with the flow of water onto
3

plaintiff's land.

(Record at 43-50).

Defendants moved for

summary judgment to establish their purported easement and to
defeat plaintiff's claim to an injunction.

(Record at 57-66).

By memorandum decision, the lower court granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment.

(Record at 93-94).

The court also entered

findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree pursuant to
said decision.

(Record at 107-111).

The court found that

defendants did not have an easement across plaintiff's property
and enjoined them from engaging in any activity calculated or
intended to direct or control the flow of water onto, over or
across plaintiff's property.

(Record at 108, 111).

The

remaining claims of the parties were dismissed pursuant to court
order dated May 21, 1993.

(Record at 136).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Exhibit "A" included in the addendum hereto is a true

and correct copy of the Utah County Plat depicting the property
subject of this litigation and illustrating the location of the
ditch which is the subject of this litigation.

(Record at 50,

66, 67, 70). Exhibit "B" included in the addendum hereto is a
hand-drawn depiction of Exhibit "A" which is not to scale.

(See

Appellant's Brief, p. 5)
2.

Defendants Joe and Bill Stansfield are the owners of a

one-half (1/2) interest in a seven-eighths (7/8) interest in
69.40 acres of land shown on Exhibit "A" as Parcel N274-A.
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(Record at 66).
3.

Plaintiff is a contract purchaser of and is in

possession of certain real property depicted on Exhibit "A" as
Parcel N390-B.

The real property shown on Exhibit "A" as Parcel

N390-A was at the inception of this action owned by Hazel M.
Jensen, Howard G. Miller, Jake A. Sorensen and Virginia H.
Horton.
4.

(Record at 49, 65).
The real property shown on Exhibit "A" as Parcel N390-C

is owned by Glen Jensen.
5.

Howard Miller and his father farmed Parcel N390-A from

1946 to 1958.
6.
A.

(Record at 49, 65).

(Record at 49, 65).

From 1958 until 1978, Howard Miller farmed Parcel N390-

(Record at 49, 65).
7.

Since 1976, Howard Miller has owned an interest in

Parcel N390-A.
8.

(Record at 49, 65).

Since 1978, Parcel 390-A has been farmed by various

lessees of Howard Miller.
9.

(Record at 48, 65).

In 1947 or 1948, Howard Miller and his father

constructed the ditch shown on Exhibit "A".

The ditch started on

Parcel N390-A and then traversed the northernmost portions of
Parcels N390-C and N390-B before entering Parcel N274-A.

(Record

at 65).
10.

Parcel N390-C has been owned by Glen Jensen since 1948.

Parcel N390-B was owned by Harold Jensen until his death on
September 3, 1951 and was purchased by plaintiff from the
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surviving spouse of Harold Jensen, Melba P. Jensen, on August 1,
1977.

(Record at 48, 65).
11.

When Howard Miller and his father constructed the ditch

shown on Exhibit "A" attached hereto, they obtained the consent
of the owners of the property, Harold Jensen as to parcel N390-B
and Glen Jensen as to Parcel N390-C.
12.

(Record at 48, 65).

Howard Miller owned 24-5/6th shares of stock in Goshen

Irrigation and Canal Company, evidence by Certificate 574, which
he used to irrigate Parcel N390-A.
13.

(Record at 49, 65).

The water right evidenced by Certificate 574 usually

entitled the owner to more than sufficient water to irrigate
Parcel N390-A.
14.

(Record at 48, 65).

Excess water from Certificate 574 and runoff water

draining from Parcel N390-A has been carried through the ditch
across Parcels N390-C and N390-B to irrigate Parcel N274-A.
(Record at 48, 65-65).
15.

The water represented by Certificate 574 is not

appurtenant to Parcel N390-A.
16.

(Record at 48, 47, 64).

Melba Jensen was appointed as the administratrix of the

estate of Harold Jensen and Parcel N390-B was distributed to her
pursuant to court decree dated April 10, 1980.

(Record at 119-

121).
17.

Neither Howard Miller nor any other party has given

notice to Melba Jensen or to any other owner, prior to this
litigation, of a claim of right to use the subject ditch to
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transport water to Parcel N274-A, nor did Howard Miller ever
obtain permission from Melba Jensen to use the ditch.

(Record at

64).
18.

Defendants Joe Stansfield and Bill Stansfield acquired

their interests in Parcel N274-A from Howard Miller.

(Record at

64).
19.

When Howard Miller sold Parcel N274-A to defendants Joe

Stansfield and Bill Stansfield, he showed them the subject ditch
and indicated to them that they could use the ditch to convey
water to Parcel N274-A.
20.

(Record at 64).

Defendants own water in the Goshen Irrigation and Canal

Company which is available to them to run across the subject
ditch to water Parcel N274-A.
21.

(Record at 64).

The subject ditch is the only available means to

provide water to Parcel N274-A.

(Record at 69).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court found that defendants had not met their
burden in establishing a prescriptive easement over plaintiff's
property, described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto as Parcel
N390-B, and that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction against
defendants prohibiting them from interfering with the flow of
water onto or across plaintiff's property.

(Record at 107-111).

The evidence below was presented by statement of facts submitted
by both plaintiff and defendants which are, for the most part,
uncontested.

The statements of fact were based upon the
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deposition of Howard Miller and upon affidavits submitted by
plaintiff and defendants.
It is undisputed that Howard Miller, defendants'
predecessor-in-interest, constructed the irrigation ditch which
is the subject of this litigation, with the consent of the then
owner of Parcel N390-B, Harold Jensen.

(Record at 65). The

evidence is also undisputed that neither Mr. Miller nor
defendants asked permission of any subsequent owners of Parcel
N390-B to use the ditch and there is no evidence that notice was
given to Harold Jensen or any subsequent owners of Parcel N390-B
that the permissive use of the subject ditch was being renounced
and that a claim of right to the ditch was being asserted.
(Record at 48, 65).
The case law in this jurisdiction as well as neighboring
jurisdictions is clear that once a use has been established as
permissive, the burden is upon the claimant to show that the use
has become adverse to the owner of the servient estate by notice
to the owner of the servient estate that the claimant is
renouncing his permissive use of the same and is making a claim
of right to an easement.

Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412

P.2d 314 (1966); Lunt v. Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 260 P.2d 535
(Utah 1953).

Wiedman v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 610

P.2d 1149 (Mont. 1980).

Defendants have not met their burden of

establishing the adverse character of their use of the subject
ditch by notice to the owners of Parcel N390-B of a claim of
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right to use the same.

Consequently, their claim to a

prescriptive easement fails.
Defendants' also claim an easement to use the subject ditch
as a result of a verbal, unrecorded grant from Harold Jensen.
Their claim is based upon Utah Code Annotated §57-1-6 and §57-32, relating to notice of written, unrecorded agreements.

In this

case, defendants' claim to a verbal easement is not substantiated
by the facts and does not satisfy the requirements of the statute
of frauds, Utah Code Annotated (1943) §33-5-1.
Defendants have not submitted any evidence, other than the
initial consent to the construction and use of the ditch by the
then owner of Parcel N390-B, Harold Jensen, to establish that
such consent amounted to a verbal grant of an easement and that
there has been part performance thereunder sufficient to satisfy
an exception to the statute of frauds.

The small ditch was built

by Howard Miller and his father using shovels and is not of a
permanent nature.

(See Appellants' Brief, p. 11). Therefore,

defendants' alternative basis for establishing an easement across
plaintiff's property is ineffective and the lower court properly
denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and properly
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment enjoining
defendants from effecting the flow of water onto and across
plaintiff's property.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING THAT
THE INITIAL PERMISSIVE USE OF THE SUBJECT DITCH
BECAME ADVERSE AS TO SUBSEQUENT OWNERS FOR THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS
A. Because it is Undisputed that the Initial Construction
and Use of the Subject Ditch was by Permission of the Owner of
the Servient Estate, Harold Jensen, the Burden Shifts to
Defendants to Establish that the Use Subsequently Became Adverse.
In 1947 or 1948, defendants1 predecessor-in-interest, Howard
Miller, asked permission from plaintiff's predecessor-ininterest, Harold Jensen, to construct a ditch for the purpose of
transporting water from Parcel N390-A to Parcel N274-A as shown
on Exhibits A and B hereto.
request.

Mr. Jensen consented to that

Based on that consent, in 1947 or 1948 Howard Miller

and his father constructed a small ditch across a portion of
plaintiff's property using shovels.
11).

(See Appellants' Brief, p.

Since obtaining the consent of Harold Jensen to construct

the ditch, neither defendants nor their predecessors-in-interest
asked permission of any subsequent owners to use the ditch nor
did they claim the use of the ditch as a matter of right.
Defendantsf first argument is that they have acquired a
right to use and maintain the ditch by prescriptive easement.
"In order to establish a prescriptive easement" defendants "must
establish a use that is (1) open, (2) notorious, (3) adverse, and
(4) continuous for at least 20 years."
788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990).
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Marchant v. Park City,

Defendants' claim to a prescriptive easement fails primarily
because defendants are unable to satisfy the requirement of
adverse use.

Because it is undisputed that Howard Miller was

given permission by the then owner of the property, Harold
Jensen, to construct and use the subject ditch, the burden is
upon defendants to show that the initial permissive use became
adverse and that the adverse use continued for a period of at
least twenty (20) years.

Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412

P.2d 314, 316 (1966) (If the owner of the servient estate is able
to show that the initial use was by permission, "the burden of
going forward with evidence and of ultimate persuasion shifts
back to the claimant to show that the use became adverse and
continued for the prescriptive period").
B. Possession and Control of the Servient Estate Belonged
to Harold Jensen or his Estate from the Time the Ditch was
Created Until 1980.
Although Harold Jensen died on September 3, 1951, his estate
was not distributed until April 10, 1980.

(Record at 120-121).

Under Utah Code Annotated (1943) §101-4-2, in effect at the time
of death of Harold Jensen in 1951, fee title to the property
vested in the heirs of Harold Jensen upon his death, subject to
administration.

However, possession of the property belonged to

the administratrix of his estate until distribution in 1980.
That section reads as follows:
The property, both real and personal, of one who dies
without disposing of it by will, passes to the heirs of the
intestate, subject to the control of the court, and to the
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possession of any administrator appointed by the court
for the purposes of administration.
In In re Jones Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (Utah
1940), the court construed Revised Statutes 1933, §101-4-2, which
is identical to §101-4-2 in the 1943 code, stating:
Our statute is entirely clear that title to property of an
intestate passes to his heirs upon his death subject to
divestment for debts and expenses. All the administrator
gets is possession. In the instant case, therefore, upon
his death, all of the decedent's estate passed to his heir
(his mother) subject to the control of the court and to the
possession of the Administratrix.
104 P.2d 213.

Consequently, possession and control of the

servient estate, Parcel N390-B, was in Harold Jensen or his
estate until 1980.

Obviously, the prescriptive period of twenty

years has not elapsed since then.

Utah Code Annotated (1943)

§102-11-5 provides that an action for the recovery of real
property by or against an administrator of the estate of an
intestate is founded on the same rights that the intestate would
have had.

That section reads as follows:

Actions for the recovery of any property, real or
personal, or for the possession thereof, or to quiet
title thereto, or to determine any adverse claim
thereon, and all actions founded upon contracts, may be
maintained by and against executors and administrators
in all cases in which the same might have been
maintained by or against their respective testators or
intestates.
Consequently, the permission granted by Harold Jensen continues
in effect as against the administrator of his estate unless and
until notice is given to the administrator of the estate of an
adverse claim of right as more fully discussed below.
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There

having been no notice given to the administrator in this case, a
prescriptive period could not have commenced herein until after
distribution of the estate in 1980.
C. Defendants Have Failed to Carry Their Burden of Proving
the Adverse Use of the Subject Ditch and that Notice of the
Adverse Character of the Use was Given to the Owner of the
Servient Estate.
It is defendants' contention that at the death of Harold
Jensen in 1951, Ipso
subsequent owners.

facto

the use became adverse as to all

Defendants do not cite any authority for that

contention and, in fact, it is contrary to well-established law.
In 25 Am Jur 2d Easements and Licenses §54 and §55, the general
rule is stated as follows:
Use by express or implied permission or license, no
matter how long continued, cannot ripen into an
easement by prescription. Furthermore, if the original
use by the claimant is by permission, it is presumed to
so continue.
***

To transform a permissive use into an adverse one,
however, there must be a distinct and positive
assertion of a right hostile to the rights of the
owner, which is brought to his attention, and the
adverse user must be for the full period required to
acquire such right, excluding the time during which the
user was permissive.
The Utah Supreme Court followed that general rule in Lunt v.
Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 262 P.2d 535 (Utah 1953).

In reversing

the lower court and in finding that the claimant's use of the
servient estate was not adverse to the owner thereof, the court
stated:
If, of course, the land owner consents to the use of his
land, then the right created is a license and a prescriptive
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right cannot arise from a license unless the licensee
renounces openly his claim under the license.
***

...[I]t is obvious where a special relationship such as a
license exists, the owner of the land is entitled to more
notice than the mere use of his land not inconsistent with
the license.
***

Since the use is presumed to have been with consent in 1920,
unless respondents in the present case presented sufficient
evidence to show that it became adverse and that the claim
of use against permission was known to the Weidners
[owners], the decree of the lower court must be reversed.
260 P.2d 537, 538.
In Wiedman v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 610 P.2d
1149 (Mont. 1980), the court held the use of certain real
property not to be adverse under facts similar to those in the
present case.

The plaintiff in that case purchased real property

anticipating that property adjacent to hers would be dedicated as
a public street.

Her home was built in anticipation of the

dedication so that the garage entrance faced what was to be the
future street.

When the developer of the subdivision decided not

to dedicate the subject property, the developer approached the
plaintiff with an offer to sell the property to her.

Plaintiff

did not buy the property and it was subsequently sold to her
neighbor to the north, Mr. Scovel.

Mr. Scovel granted permission

to the plaintiff to use the subject property as access to her
home.

Mr. Scovel subsequently sold the property to the

defendant.

The defendant planned to expand its school facilities

and to place a fence and curbing around the subject property so
14

as to interfere with plaintiff's access to her home.

In holding

that the plaintiff had not established a prescriptive easement,
the court stated:
When a party's use of property is permissive at its
inception, the use cannot ripen into a prescriptive right
unless there is a later distinct assertion of a right
hostile to the owner, which is brought to the attention of
the owner and the use is continued for the full prescriptive
period.
The above discussion shows that Ms. Wiedman's [the
plaintiff's] use of the disputed property was initially
permissive. Before her use of the property could become
hostile and eventually ripen into a prescriptive right, Ms.
Wiedman would have had to make some positive assertion of
the hostile nature of her use of the property and bring the
fact of her hostile use to the attention of the owner of the
property. The record is totally devoid of any such action
by Ms. Wiedman. She testified that she and Mr. Scovel did
not discuss her use of the property after their conversation
in which he granted her permission to use the property. The
evidence also shows that Ms. Wiedman never discussed her use
of the property with the owners of Trinity Evangelical
Lutheran Church [defendant]. Ms. Wiedman's use of the
property was thus permissive at its inception and continued
to be so until the time she initiated this action.
610 P.2d 1152.
In the present case, there is no evidence that defendants or
their predecessors-in-interest ever renounced their permissive
right to use the subject ditch, nor is there any evidence that
defendants or their predecessors-in-interest gave notice to the
owner of the servient estate of a claim of right to use the ditch
so as to begin a period of adverse use.

Defendants' sole

argument on this issue is that by reason of the death of Harold
Jensen, an adverse use began as against subsequent owners without
the necessity of any notice of a claim of right to the subsequent
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owners of the property.

A similar argument was soundly rejected

by the court in the City of Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324
(Alaska 1975).

Therein the court stated:

It is true that the conveyance of a servient estate will in
most cases constitute a basis for terminating a license.
But such an implied revocation, without more, does not ipso
facto transform a permissive use into an adverse one.
530 P.2d 1329.

The court then quoted from Sturnick v. Watson,

336 Mass. 139, 142 N.E. 2d 896 (1957) as follows:
"It doubtless is the law that a license to use another's
land is revocable not only at the will of the owner of the
property on which it is to be exercised, but by alienation
of the land by him. But it does not follow that if the
licensee continues to use the land as before, such use is
necessarily adverse to the new owner. Whether the use after
the conveyance was permissive or adverse was a question of
fact and on this issue, the plaintiff [claimant] had the
burden of proof." (Omitting citations).
530 P.2d 1330.
The Alaska Supreme Court followed the holding in Sturnick v.
Watson, and also quoted with approval from Scheller v. Pierce
County, 55 Wash. 298, 104 P. 277 (1909), in establishing the
standard requisite to convert a permissive use to an adverse use:
"If permissive at its inception, then such permissive
character being stamped on the use at the outset, will
continue of the same nature, and no adverse user can arise
until a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile
to the owner, and brought home to him, can transform a
subordinate and friendly holding into one of an opposite
nature, and exclusive and independent in its character."
530 P.2d 1330.

In Scheller v. Pierce County, supra, the original

use of the subject property was with permission which continued
for a period of five years.

The mere fact that the servient
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estate changed hands did not transform the use from permissive to
adverse.
In the present case, defendants have presented no evidence
to sustain their burden of proof on the issue of adverse use
after the death of Harold Jensen.

The facts which defendants

rely upon to establish their easement, as stated at page 13 of
their brief, are as follows:
Harold Jensen died in 1951. Upon his death, his ownership
of the property necessarily ceased. The new owners never
gave their permission to use the ditch. Therefore, the
prescriptive easement began to run in 1951 and vested in
1971.
At page 14 of their brief, defendants recognize that they have
not met their burden to establish the adverse use of the ditch as
against subsequent owners:
In the case at bar, the initial owner of the land gave
permission to use the land. The subsequent owners didn't.
Permissive or hostile use as to subsequent owners is an open
issue and is a material question of fact which precludes
summary judgment.
Defendants' failure to produce evidence does not raise a
genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary
judgment.

The evidence is that the initial construction and use

of the ditch were with the consent and permission of the owner,
Harold Jensen.

Harold Jensen died in 1951.

of right was given to any subsequent owner.

No notice of a claim
Consequently, under

Lunt v. Kitchens, supra, and the other cases cited above,
defendants' claim to an easement by prescription fails regardless
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of whether Harold Jensen's estate or his heirs are deemed to have
owned or possessed Parcel N390-B after his death.
Defendants reliance on Richins v. Struhs, supra, is
misplaced and misstated.

In that case, two brothers-in-law owned

adjoining properties in Emigration Canyon and jointly constructed
a lane and bridge to access their properties.

The court

specifically found that the use of the lane and bridge was not
permissive, but on the contrary, found that each of the parties
adversely used the other's portion of the lane as access.

The

court stated:
In order for the use to be permissive, it would have to
appear that the parties understood that the driveway was
upon the Whipple's (defendant's predecessors) property; that
it was with this understanding that they gave their consent
to its use; and similarly that the Joneses (plaintiffs'
predecessors) so understood and accepted and used it. No
such view of the facts is warranted by the evidence. On the
contrary, when it is considered in the light of the
principles of law and equity herein discussed, it is our
opinion that the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the
facts here shown, where the parties (predecessors) jointly
established and used a driveway on what they thought their
common boundary, is that the use meets the requirement of
being open, notorious, continuous and adverse for more than
20 years, and therefore has established a prescriptive right
to continue to so use it.
412 P.2d 316, 317.
In this case, it is undisputed that the initial use was
permissive, thereby placing on defendants the burden of proving
that the use became adverse and that notice of the adverse use
was given to the owner.

Defendants have not sustained that

burden.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH A VERBAL AGREEMENT
BY HAROLD JENSEN TO CONVEY AN EASEMENT TO
PLAINTIFF, WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, WOULD
VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
As an alternative to the claimed right to use the subject
ditch under prescriptive easement, defendants argue that the
permission granted by Harold Jensen to Howard Miller to construct
and use the ditch constituted a verbal grant of an unrecorded
easement.

In so arguing, defendants rely upon cases construing

former Utah Code Annotated §57-1-6 and current §57-3-2(2)
relating to notice of unrecorded documents.

Those sections,

however, only address written documents creating rights as
between the parties thereto.

Defendants have not submitted any

evidence of an agreement between Mr. Miller and Mr. Jensen.

At

best, the permission granted by Mr. Jensen constituted a mere
license to Mr. Miller to use Parcel N390-B to construct a ditch
to transport water.

There is no evidence of a "meeting of the

minds" to convey an easement from Mr. Jensen to Mr. Miller, nor
is there evidence of any consideration given therefor.

Southland

Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1988).
Furthermore, defendants claim to a granted easement would
violate the statute of frauds.

Utah Code Annotated (1943) §33-5-

1, in effect at the time of the consent given by Harold Jensen to
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construct the ditch and which is identical to current §25-5-1,
provides:
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases
for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power
over or concerning real property or in any matter relating
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law or by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing.
The statutes and cases cited by defendants are inapposite
because they address notice to third persons of existing rights
between the parties to an agreement, whereas, in this case, no
enforceable agreement has come into existence because defendants'
claim does not satisfy the statute of frauds.
In an analogous case, Wells v. Marcus, 25 Utah 2d 242, 480
P.2d 129 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim to an
easement based on an oral grant.

In that case, the parties

predecessors-in-interest worked together in constructing a
pipeline to convey creek water in a common pipe to a point of
division and then in separate pipes to their respective
residences.

In denying an easement to defendants, the court

stated:
The right sought by the defendants to maintain a pipeline
across the plaintiff's land would be an easement, and thus
and interest in land. It being without dispute that there
has been no written conveyance, the defendants1 claim would
normally be defeated by the Statute of Frauds.
480 P.2d at 130.

The court noted an exception to the general
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rule as stated in 1 Thompson, Real Property, Sec. 356 (Perm. Ed.
1939):
"Under the equitable doctrine of part performance, a
verbal agreement for an easement has been enforced by some
courts. This doctrine applies to all cases in which a court
of equity would entertain a suit for specific performance if
the alleged contract had been in writing.
***

If expenditures be made in permanent improvements
inuring to the benefit of a licensor under an express
oral license given by him, then such license becomes
irrevocable, and, if it relates to the use or
occupation of real estate, it becomes and easement.
480 P.2d 130.

The court found that in that case the evidence did

not sustain the finding of part or full performance in reliance
on the verbal agreement.

In the present case, defendants have

not produced any evidence of full or part performance based on
the consent given by Harold Jensen to Howard Miller to construct
a ditch, nor is there any evidence of the permanent nature of the
ditch.

In fact, the evidence is that the ditch is small and was

constructed by Howard Miller and his father using shovels.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 11). There is no evidence that any
permanent improvement has been made thereto.
Finally, defendants contend that there is a factual issue as
to plaintiff's notice of the subject ditch.

That assertion,

however, begs the question of what effect notice of the existence
of the ditch would have on defendants1 right to an easement.
Assuming, argruendo, that plaintiff had notice of the ditch at the
time he acquired Parcel N390-B, because defendants did not have a
right to an easement at the time plaintiff acquired the property,
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either by prescription or by grant, any such notice is
immaterial.

Observance of the existence of the ditch does not

create in defendants a right to an easement where none
theretofore existed.

In any event, defendants cannot rely upon

their own failure to produce evidence of notice to plaintiff in
order to create a factual question as to an issue upon which they
had the burden of proof.
The evidence, and the foregoing authority, clearly
demonstrates that defendants are not entitled to an easement
across plaintiff's property pursuant to a purported unrecorded
verbal grant from Harold Jensen.

Therefore, defendants claim to

an easement was properly denied by the lower court.
CONCLUSION
Because the subject ditch in this case was constructed and
used by Howard Miller with the consent of the owner of Parcel
N390-B, Harold Jensen, a presumption is created that the use
continues as permissive until such time as the claimant renounces
his permissive use and notifies the owner of the servient estate
of his claim of right to use of the ditch.

In this case there

has been no evidence presented to rebut the presumption of
continued permissive use of the ditch and consequently
defendants' claim for an easement across plaintiffs' property was
properly denied by the trial court.

The foregoing presumption

and result applies whether the owner of the servient estate was
Harold Jensen, his estate, his surviving spouse, or plaintiff.
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This matter was submitted to the court on cross motions for
summary judgment on essentially undisputed facts.

There is no

evidence of an agreement on the part of Harold Jensen to convey
an easement and there is no evidence that the subject ditch is
such a permanent improvement so as to create an irrevocable
license in favor of defendants1 predecessor-in-interest or to
create an exception to the statute of frauds.

Consequently, the

lower court properly found that no verbal conveyance of an
easement was made by Harold Jensen.
Based upon the foregoing, the court properly granted
plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment in enjoining defendants
from effecting the flow of water onto or across plaintiffs1 land,
and properly denied defendants' motion for summary judgment to
establish a prescriptive easement.

Therefore, plaintiff

respectfully requests that the court affirm the decision of the
lower court in all respects.
Dated:

December ^ Z ^ 1993.
Respectfully submitted,

JERRY/If. 'REYNOLDS

c:\jlr\green.brf
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
**********

DUANE GREEN,
Plaintiff,

Case Number

-VS-

900400579

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

BOYD STANSFIELD, JOE STANDSFIELD
and BILL STANSFIELD,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

**********

The Court denies defendants' request for oral
argument based on its untimeliness pursuant to Rule 4-501,
U.R.J.A.
The Court having considered both parties' motions for
summary judgment hereby grants plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and denies defendants'. The Court finds there are no
genuine issues of material fact which would preclude such
judgment and that plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Rule 56, U.R.C.P.
The Court finds that it is undisputed that Harold
Jensen gave permission to defendants to build and use the
irrigation ditch at issue. Such permission prevented the
defendants from gaining a prescriptive easement for the time
period during which Harold Jensen and his estate owned the
property. Melba Jensen then acquired title to the property
through inheritance in 1980 as shown by the Decree of
Distribution In the Matter of the Estate of Harold Le Roy
Jensen dated April 10, 1980. Whether Melba Jensen, as
subsequent owner of the property, gave defendants permission

to use the irrigation ditch or the defendants were using the
ditch openly and notoriously since 1980 is irrelevant, since
the time period of ten years or less is as a matter of law not
long enough to establish a prescriptive easement in the
irrigation ditch.
The jury trial set for this matter on April 15th and
16th at 9:00 a.m. is hereby stricken from the Court's calendar.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare an order consistent
with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing
counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the
court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect
until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 27th day of March, 1991.

cc:

Dallas H. Young, Esq.
S. Junior Baker, Esq.
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DALLAS H. YOUNG (3585)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUK7Y,
STATE OF UTAH
DUANE GREEN,

)

Plaintiff,

)

VS.

)
)
BOYD STANSFIELD, JOE STANSFIELD, )
and BILL STANSFIELD,
)
)
Defendants.
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AN!
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 900400579
Judge Harding

Both parties to the above entitled action have submitted
motions for summary judgment.
1.

It appears without dispute that the plaintiff is the

contract purchaser and in possession of that parcel of property
which has been designated as Parcel N390-B on the official plat
kept by the Utah County Recorder in the County Recorder's office
at Provo, Utah.

Parcel N390-B is located in Section 3 of Township

2 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base Meridian.

On the official

plat the property appears to be in the name of Melba P. Jensen.
Allegations contained in the affidavits of the plaintiff which are
admitted by the defendants show that the plaintiff is the contract
purchaser of Parcel N390-B and is in possession thereof.
2.

The court finds

that the affidavits on file anf the

admissions contained in the pleadings establish the fact that a
ditch exists which traverses the north end of Parcel N390-B in an
east-west direction.
3.

The ditch described above has been used in the past to

convey water from property heretofore owned by Howard G. Miller,
Hazel M. Jensen, Waldo Sorensen, J. K. Sorensen as trustees and
Virginia H. Horton across property now owned by Glen Jensen and
Mildred Jensen which is shown on the Utah County Recorder's plat
for Section 3, Township 10 South, Range 1 West as ParcelAG90-C and
across parcelA/390-B for the purpose of irrigating land now owned
by William Boyd Stansfield and Joseph Cly Stansfield which land is
shown on the Utah County Recorder's office plat as Parcel N274-A..
4.

The claim of the defendants asserted in defendants'

counterclaim and in its motion for summary judgment to be entitled
to outilize the ditch across parcelj/390-B was based upon a claimed
prescriptive right.
5.

The maintenance of the ditch across Parcel N390-B by

Howard Miller and his tenants and his co-owner's tenants was a
permissive use at least as late as the 28th day of March, 1980.
The defendants' predecessors in title having having maintained the
ditch across ParcelAG90-B with the express permission of the owner
thereof, Harold Jensen.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and
enters the following:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1)

The plaintiff's predecessors in title did not own a

prescriptive right to maintain the irrigation ditch described in
the Findings of Fact across the plaintiff's property identified as
N390-B;
(2)

Plaintiff is entitled to an order from the court

enjoining the defendants ai3 each of them from maintaining any
ditch or structure to dirert or control the flow of water on or
across the plaintiff's lanf;
(3)
Dated:

Defendants' moti:n for summary judgment should be denied,

April

/ O

, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

IARDING, J u d g e
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

rf%^

<TUttZ50R BAKER

Attorney for Defendants
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DALLAS H. YOUNG (3585)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: 375-3000
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
DUANE GREEN,
Plaintiff,
DECREE

vs.
BOYD STANSFIELD, JOE STANSFIELD,
and BILL STANSFIELD,

Case No. 900400579
Judge Harding

Defendants.
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
heretofore entered, the court now makes and enters the following:
DECREE
1. The defendants Boyd Stansfield, Joe Stansfield and Bill
Stansfield are each permanently enjoined from engaging in any
activity on that parcel of land described in the Findings of Fact
as Parcel N-390-B in Section 3, Township 10 South, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake Base Meridian which is calculated or intended or has as
its purpose the directing or control of the flow of water onto,
over or across said Parcel N-390-B.
Dated: April /O
, 1991.

/U^*&**->
RAYrWtf-fiARDING,

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/Z^

MfB, BAKER
^UNiqp^
Attorney for Defendants
green3.5

Judge

